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Exploring the Connections Between 
Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses 
Susan Frelich Appleton† and Robert A. Pollak†† 
For many years, conventional wisdom has embraced with 
little examination what I. Glenn Cohen and Daniel L. Chen dub 
“the substitution theory”—the claim that facilitating treatment 
for infertility, including subsidizing in vitro fertilization (IVF), 
decreases adoptions.1 According to this arm-chair principle,2 
making IVF more affordable will attract to such medical inter-
ventions infertile adults who, in the absence of subsidies, would 
adopt children instead. In order to enhance the prospect that 
children awaiting placement will find adoptive homes, the ar-
gument proceeds, we should reject the call for insurance man-
dates to cover IVF. 
In Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: 
Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should It 
Matter? (the “Article”), Cohen and Chen venture well beyond 
the arm chair, closely interrogating the substitution theory 
both normatively and empirically. In the cheery conclusions 
that Cohen and Chen present, there is a strong normative case 
in favor of IVF insurance mandates and, as an empirical mat-
ter, a robust adoption rate can happily coexist along with sub-
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 1. I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technol-
ogy and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should 
It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2010). 
 2. See id. at 527, 536 (referencing arm-chair predictions and perspectives). 
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sidized IVF—given surprising evidence that the latter might 
well give a boost to the former.3 
After a brief summary of their Article and its strengths, 
this Response to Cohen and Chen returns to the arm chair, 
where the substitution theory originated. To be more precise, 
we write from two different arm chairs, one occupied by a law 
professor whose work focuses on families, gender, and repro-
duction, and the other occupied by an economist whose work fo-
cuses on the economics of the family. Borrowing the name of 
the IVF-based familial arrangement most recently to attract 
popular attention, we call our analyses “twibling” because each 
has developed in a different disciplinary environment although 
both stem from a single source, Cohen and Chen’s Article, and 
we join them here, despite their contrasting styles and distinct 
personalities.4 From our respective vantage points, we explore 
some of the assumptions, value judgments, and contradictions 
that the authors overlook, emphasizing omissions we think de-
serve deeper examination.  
Cohen and Chen first press the normative case for IVF 
subsidies; that is, insurance laws that require coverage of IVF. 
In this part, the authors make valuable contributions to the 
discourse, strengthening the theoretical scaffolding supporting 
increased access to IVF. They invoke authorities establishing 
that infertility constitutes a disability and that medical treat-
ment for infertility promotes health,5 they argue that infertility 
should not be demoted to a “second-class” health need,6 and 
they grapple with the moral-theory challenges posed by weigh-
ing benefits to would-be IVF consumers against the hypothe-
 
 3. Id. at 533, 553–54 (summarizing findings). 
 4. Melanie Thernstrom, Meet the Twiblings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, § 6 
(Magazine), at 32–35, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/magazine/ 
02babymaking-t.html (describing the author’s creation of two embryos from 
her husband’s sperm and one donor’s ova, with each embryo gestated simulta-
neously by a different “surrogate,” resulting in two children born within five 
days of the other and reared together by the author and her husband). Twibl-
ings are not twins, but they are more than ordinary siblings, given their birth 
dates. After the New York Times coverage, the story also was broadcast on the 
Today Show and National Public Radio, among other media. See, e.g., Talk of 
the Nation: Two Babies from Two Surrogates (NPR broadcast Jan. 5, 2011), 
transcript available at 2011 WLNR 260133; Today Show: Profile: Today’s 
Family (NBC television broadcast Jan. 4, 2011), transcript available at 2011 
WLNR 163198. 
 5. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 501–02. 
 6. Id. at 515–17. 
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sized detriments to children awaiting adoption.7 They do as-
sume—in our view, rather too readily—that establishing that a 
procedure promotes health suffices to make the case for public 
subsidies or mandates, without considering cost as well as ben-
efit. 
Turning next to the available empirical evidence, they in-
vestigate “the effect of state-level insurance mandates covering 
IVF on adoption rates.”8 Even in states with the most generous 
coverage, “complete mandates,”9 the substitution theory finds 
no support. Indeed, according to their initial findings, the data 
yield unexpected conclusions: complete mandates have a posi-
tive, statistically significant effect on non relative adoptions, 
adoptions from foster care, and the total measure of public and 
private adoptions from the pertinent data set; such mandates 
have a negative effect only on relative adoptions.10 As one way 
to make sense of these counter intuitive findings, Cohen and 
Chen propose the following possible story: perhaps mandates 
encourage the infertile to try IVF, which does not have high 
success rates but might reinforce the desire to have children; 
when medical intervention fails, these disappointed IVF pa-
tients then turn to adoption.11 
Cohen and Chen’s study has many strengths. We find it 
both provocative and rich with detail. We admire their effort to 
take seriously the substitution theory and subject it to close 
scrutiny. Certainly, those who study, teach, and research adop-
tion and assisted reproduction know much more now than they 
did before Cohen and Chen undertook this important project. 
Part I considers what an analysis based in family law can 
add to Cohen and Chen’s work. Part II applies economic analy-
sis to the questions that the authors seek to answer. While ap-
plauding all that Cohen and Chen bring to the debate about the 
substitution theory, we conclude that arm-chair theorizing still 
has a valuable part to play. 
 
 7. Id. at 520–21. 
 8. Id. at 551. 
 9. Id. at 538 (defining the phrase). Cohen and Chen identify Massachu-
setts, Rhode Island, Illinois, and New Jersey as complete-mandate states. Id. 
 10. Id. at 553. 
 11. Id. at 564, 575; see also id. at 572 (elaborating upon another hypothe-
sis, focusing on adoptions from foster care); id. at 576 (briefly offering alterna-
tive hypotheses resembling those explored infra in Part III).  
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I.  A VIEW FROM FAMILY LAW   
Cohen and Chen’s investigation fails to confront a number 
of assumptions and first principles that would loom large for 
those who theorize about families and family law. These gaps 
concern the social meaning of both adoption and assisted re-
production as methods of creating legally recognized parent-
child relationships, as well as the policy questions posed by 
these practices.12 Notably, while shoring up the “theoretical 
foundation” for increasing access to IVF,13 Cohen and Chen 
leave largely unexamined the implications of their work for 
how IVF shapes our understanding of adoption, how adoption 
shapes our understanding of IVF, and the role of law in each of 
these constructions. They also neglect important questions 
about the place of genetics, reproductive autonomy, and gender 
equality in their approach. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ADOPTION 
One question that Cohen and Chen seek to answer, accord-
ing to the title of their piece, is whether the substitution theory, 
if valid, “should . . . matter.”14 For their challenge to this theory 
to have maximum traction, adoption must be a positive institu-
tion with benefits for individual children, society, or both. Oth-
erwise, no one would care that IVF subsidies might decrease 
adoptions—the substitution theory would not matter. In pur-
suing this issue, however, Cohen and Chen treat domestic 
adoption and intercountry adoption quite differently, without 
any explanation. 
Regarding intercountry adoption, Cohen and Chen concede 
a number of difficulties, including “exploitation or cultural 
theft,”15 that might make a decrease in such adoptions desira-
ble. By contrast, they assume that domestic adoption is essen-
tially beneficial and that a decrease should be avoided, never 
acknowledging the significant criticisms of the child welfare 
system and the practice of adoption within the United States. If 
domestic adoption turns out to be as problematic as they say 
intercountry adoption might well be, then at best they have 
made the case for IVF subsidies more onerous than it needs to 
be. At worst, they have gone to battle with a straw man. 
 
 12. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Repro-
ductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393. 
 13. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 500. 
 14. Id. at 485. 
 15. Id. at 527. 
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Both historically and in the present day, the portrayal of 
domestic adoption as a humanitarian and altruistic practice 
has competed with darker accounts. Retrospective analyses of 
the “child rescue” philosophy of the era of the orphan trains 
and the wholesale break up of Native American families raise 
questions about social engineering and bias that, for some, still 
ring true today.16 Thus, for example, Dorothy Roberts contends 
that contemporary state intervention that makes many child-
ren available for adoption misunderstands and disrespects fam-
ilies of origin who do not conform to white, middle-class 
norms.17 Although the relationship between the child welfare 
system and adoption remains contested turf,18 Cohen and Chen 
do not acknowledge the debate. 
Along similar lines, we can find in the case law and litera-
ture on domestic adoption reasons to question the voluntari-
ness of birth parents’ consent to adoption, especially when the 
parent is a young, sexually active female19 or an unmarried fa-
ther.20 Adoption emerges from these cases as what historian 
Rickie Solinger would call evidence of the “choicelessness” of 
marginalized segments of our population21 and as a practice re-
 
 16. See MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN 
AMERICA 183–87 (1992); Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1, 13–20 (2001); Barbara Ann Atwood, Achieving Permanency for Amer-
ican Indian and Alaska Native Children: Lessons from Tribal Traditions, 37 
CAP. U. L. REV. 239, 239 (2008). 
 17. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF 
CHILD WELFARE (2002). The zeal with which some religious groups sought to 
remove children from Haiti after the recent earthquake evoke similar conten-
tions, providing another illustration of a problem that Cohen and Chen appar-
ently do not appreciate. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Haiti Charges Americans with 
Child Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 
2459443. 
 18. See, e.g., Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child Pover-
ty: The Pew Commission Recommendations and the Transracial Adoption De-
bate, 66 MONT. L. REV. 21, 21–22 (2005).  
 19. See, e.g., In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003) (uphold-
ing an unmarried minor mother’s consent to adoption, despite her attempt to 
revoke consent and claims that prospective adoptive parents pressured her); 
ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN 
WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE (2006). 
 20. One can find a number of recent cases in Utah. E.g., O’Dea v. Olea, 
217 P.3d 704 (Utah 2009); E.G. v. C.C.D., 233 P.3d 517, 522–23 (Utah Ct. App. 
2010); N.T. v. Doe, 199 P.3d 368 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
 21. RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF 
CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
67 (2001). 
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flecting official preferences for certain family settings over oth-
ers.22 Perhaps, then, adoption skeptics would applaud in-
creased access to IVF if it reduced the “demand” side of what 
some conceptualize as the market for adoptive children,23 in 
turn decreasing state intervention in families of origin and 
promoting support for such families to remain intact.  
This critique does not mean we should abolish adoption, 
even if that is the position championed by some radical birth 
parent support groups.24 Rather, the point is to situate Cohen 
and Chen’s assumptions about domestic adoption in a more 
nuanced context and to invite a closer look at whether the subs-
titution theory should matter—and why.  
B. CONSTRUCTIONS OF ADOPTION AND IVF 
Despite critiques of adoption, law and popular culture 
commonly share the assumptions of Cohen and Chen, viewing 
adoption through a humanitarian lens that depicts selfless 
adults welcoming parentless children into their homes and 
hearts. The notion of adoption as an advantageous and valua-
ble practice, designed to protect and advance the interests of 
children (rather than of adults seeking to become parents), con-
trasts with the popular understanding of assisted reproduction, 
including IVF, whose users are often depicted as self-
indulgent25 shoppers for “designer babies”26 or “insta-
famil[ies].”27 The notorious “Octomom” stands out as a carica-
 
 22. See JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE 
CHANGING CULTURE OF MOTHERHOOD 1851–1950, at 5–6 (2000). 
 23. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 17, at 166–67; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altru-
ism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 203, 
247–50 (2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 22, 1993, at 56, 58–61 (describing the position of Concerned United 
Birthparents (CUB)). 
 25. See Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 16–17, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14letters-t-
HERBODYMYBAB_LETTERS.html?scp=3&sq=alex%20her%20body%20my% 
20baby&st=cse (responding to Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at 42 (Magazine), available at 2008 WLNR 22925338). 
 26. See Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong 
with Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, ATLANTIC, 
Apr. 2004, at 50, 51; see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay 
on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190 (2001) (exposing 
how personal and selfish reasons often motivate human reproduction). 
 27. See The Futuristic Insta-Family, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, § 6 (Mag-
azine), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/22/magazine/ 
20101222-twiblings-audio.html?ref=assistedreproductivetechnology (inviting 
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ture of this depiction—reckless, narcissistic, and consuming 
more than her fair share of resources.28 
Against this background, one particular IVF-based prac-
tice—and its proponents’ terminology—stand out: “embryo 
adoption.”29 Cohen and Chen do not discuss this practice,30 in 
which unused embryos created by others are transferred for 
gestation to an intended mother. President George W. Bush, 
among others, has promoted embryo adoption,31 with the word 
choice meant to signal the same sort of selfless, loving embrace 
of an orphan that we usually associate with “infant adoption” 
or “child adoption,” thereby deflecting the popular understand-
ing of IVF patients.32 
Despite the rhetoric, however, embryo adoption is not an 
adoption at all, but in reality a high-tech medical intervention 
that bypasses many of the difficulties that more traditional 
adoptions are thought to present. What are the comparative 
difficulties of traditional adoption? They include some of the 
considerations that Cohen and Chen mention, including adop-
ters’ preferences for children of a certain age or race. They also 
include some of the complications that come with age, such as a 
past history of disrupted relationships and foster care. Even an 
 
comments to Thernstrom, supra note 4); see also Jody Lynée Madeira, Com-
mon Misconceptions: Reconciling Legal Constructions of Women in the Infer-
tility and Abortion Contexts 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors) (citing criticisms of those who use ART). 
 28. Josephine Johnston, Judging Octomom, 30 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23, 24 
(2009) (questioning whether fertility doctors should follow unwise preferences 
of their patients); cf. Kimberly Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the “Octo-
mom”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120, 120 (“Few familiar with the story of 
Nadya Suleman—a single, low-income, California mother of six who recently 
gave birth to octuplets conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF)—do not 
instinctively react with outrage.”). 
 29. Paul C. Redman II & Lauren Fielder Redman, Seeking a Better Solu-
tion for the Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption the Answer?, 
35 TULSA L.J. 583, 587–89 (2000); see also Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: 
The Legal and Moral Challenges, 1 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 106–
08 (2007) (explaining embryo adoption and its use); Molly Miller, Note, Emb-
ryo Adoption: The Solution to an Ambiguous Intent Standard, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 869 (2010) (describing embryo adoption).  
 30. As noted below, they treat IVF as a method of achieving genetic re-
production only. See infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Sarah Blustain, Embryo Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 6 
(Magazine), available at 2005 WLNR 19895218. 
 32. Many prefer the term “embryo donation.” See Charles P. Kindregan, 
Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Issues in the Transfer 
of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 174–75 (2004). This 
locution portrays the progenitors, rather than the recipients, as the selfless, 
generous, and empathy-motivated actors. 
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adopted newborn has a prenatal history. By contrast, embryo 
adopters can start to exercise control during gestation, limiting 
exposure to harmful substances and ensuring the benefits of 
good prenatal care. Finally, given the enhanced bargaining 
power of birth parents occasioned by the “shortage” of healthy 
white infants available for adoption,33 traditional adoptions are 
increasingly likely to be “open” or at least to entail the main-
tenance of some ties between the adoptee and the birth family, 
in turn making parenthood via adoption less a replica of biolog-
ical parenthood than its own distinctive and complicated set of 
relationships. 
So-called embryo adoption not only avoids such difficulties 
but, at least in this country, it and similar practices flourish in 
a largely laissez-faire zone. While adopters must usually satisfy 
legal requirements, including home studies and judicial ap-
proval, IVF and other forms of assisted reproduction belong to 
the discretion and choices of consumers and those whose assis-
tance they obtain, from medical practitioners, to intermedia-
ries, to lawyers, to genetic donors or sellers—generally with lit-
tle explicit regulation by the state. The “fertility industry” is 
big business both here and internationally; the strong legal and 
social policies against commodifying children mean that we do 
not have (or should not have) an “adoption industry” that can 
compete.34 
When Cohen and Chen decry the difficulty of identifying a 
“neutral position” for government to take as between encourag-
ing adoption versus IVF, they consider only explicit subsidies.35 
They overlook all the protective restrictions and other legal 
“red tape” that arguably discourage adoption but not IVF, as 
well as the business practices that promote IVF. They do not 
spell out what factors are included in their consideration, as a 
possible control variable, of “how adoption-friendly each state 
[in the study] was.”36 Notwithstanding their empirical findings 
that adoption fares well even with subsidized IVF, their focus 
on the goal that each of these paths to parenthood is intended 
to reach (a child to rear) overlooks significant distinctions in 
the processes themselves, processes that might well affect pre-
 
 33. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 497. 
 34. Kimberly Krawiec exposes how this anticommodification policy ap-
plies asymmetrically, benefiting intermediaries and disadvantaging birth par-
ents. Krawiec, supra note 23, at 250–51. 
 35. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 512 (identifying a “baseline problem”). 
 36. Id. at 544 n.204. 
  
68 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [95:60 
 
ferences and choices. Put differently, law imposes burdens on 
those who adopt but not those who use IVF, even if IVF re-
quires onerous medical procedures.  
As these observations suggest, understood against IVF, 
adoption emerges as altruistic and child-centered, but difficult 
and complicated, with both procedural and substantive legal 
entanglements to navigate and little respect for privacy. At the 
same time, our understanding of adoption constructs a view of 
assisted reproduction, including IVF, as self-regarding and ex-
pensive but free from burdensome regulation. Particularly with 
the contemporary medicalization of childbirth, IVF emerges as 
a much closer approximation of sexual reproduction, with its 
presumptive shield of constitutional privacy, compared to adop-
tion. The practice known as embryo adoption offers the best of 
both worlds: the rhetorical satisfaction of performing a humani-
tarian act coupled with the privacy and control offered by as-
sisted reproduction. 
Cohen and Chen ignore these constructions, saying nothing 
to challenge the common understanding of adoption as a 
“second choice” or even “last resort” path to parenthood. Indeed, 
in explaining their findings, they hypothesize that prospective 
parents will try IVF before turning to adoption.37 They do not 
address the possibility that improvement in IVF success rates 
might follow from increased use as a result of subsidies, in turn 
producing still more “substitutions.” Yet, even if the data now 
provide no empirical support for the substitution theory, it does 
not follow that Cohen and Chen will have put to rest this 
theory and its premises. The ranking of IVF ahead of adoption 
has a life of its own, regardless of the evidence. Thus, one can 
find this treatment of the options not only in the scholarly lite-
rature38 and in qualitative data,39 but in the popular conscious-
ness as well.40 From our arm-chair perspective, providing 
greater support for IVF would be likely to strengthen this 
common understanding of adoption as a “last resort”—even if 
the substitution theory is only a myth. 
 
 37. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 38. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND 
THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 30–35 (1999); see also JOHN A. 
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 277 n.27 (1994).  
 39. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 573. 
 40. See, e.g., Julie Robicaux, IVF Versus Adoption: Why ‘Just Adopt’ Is Not 
the Answer, TODAYMOMS (Dec. 7, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://moms.today.com/_ 
news/2010/12/07/5605590-ivf-versus-adoption-why-just-adopt-is-not-the-answer. 
  
2011] TWIBLING ANALYSES 69 
 
C. THE PLACE OF GENETICS 
The example of embryo adoption stands out as important 
for still another reason. Cohen and Chen treat IVF largely as a 
means of facilitating genetic reproduction. That is, they assume 
that the IVF procedures covered by insurance mandates will 
entail only those that allow the intended parents to have child-
ren conceived from their own genetic materials, rather than us-
ing gametes from donors. So, for example, they discuss IVF’s 
benefits in the context of expressed preferences for genetic over 
adopted children41 and insurance mandates as enabling genetic 
reproduction42—with implications for the understanding of 
adoption as “second choice.” They allude to what they call “rad-
ical feminist critiques of IVF” by those who question IVF’s 
“problematic expressive effect of reinforcing the centrality of bi-
ological ties for family.”43 Their empirical study contains nu-
merous references to “Nondonor IVF cycles,”44 although occa-
sionally they do not identify the source of the genetic material 
and sometimes their reasoning implies that they probably con-
template the use of donated genetic material.45 
No doubt, much IVF use tracks the pattern that Cohen and 
Chen assume, with preembryos that are conceived in vitro for 
transfer to the uterus of the genetic mother, who intends to 
rear the child(ren) with the man who is also the genetic father. 
Yet, as the example of so-called embryo adoption illustrates, 
the radically transformative—and much more intellectually in-
teresting—power of IVF lies in its ability to separate once-
unified aspects of parentage and to challenge traditional mod-
els by recognizing new family forms, such as children with 
three parents, with no father, with two mothers, or with no 
mother.46 Given such possibilities as egg donation and gesta-
 
 41. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 517–18. 
 42. Id. at 519–20. 
 43. Id. at 506. 
 44. Id. at 544 tbl.2, 555 tbl.4. But see id. at 556 tbl.5. 
 45. See id. at 567 (regarding adopters’ age, with its implications for 
donor eggs). 
 46. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (holding that both 
the woman providing ova to lesbian partner and the partner who bore child 
via IVF are the child’s parents); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 126 (Md. 
2007) (holding that birth certificate may list father only, when neither gesta-
tional carrier nor ovum donor wishes recognition as mother); cf. Jacob v. 
Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (rejecting, in context of 
involved sperm donor and lesbian couple, lower court’s holding that recogniz-
ing three legal parents “would create an untenable situation”).  
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tional surrogacy—not to mention more well-established and us-
er-friendly options such as donor insemination—genetic repro-
duction and traditional adoption mark out two ends of a conti-
nuum, with many different collaborations and combinations in 
between.47 
As Elizabeth Bartholet has written, adoption’s regulatory 
structure sends a message of suspicion and distrust of those 
who would seek to parent “someone else’s child.”48 Yet, IVF 
permits arrangements that disrupt the very idea of “someone 
else’s child.” Many authorities have responded to collaborative 
reproduction by recognizing as legal parents the intended par-
ents, regardless of the source of genetic material.49 Hence, such 
legal parents are rearing “their own child” although donors 
provided the sperm and/or ova. 
Even if such legal parents never entirely lose sight of the 
missing genetic ties to their children,50 IVF and its variations 
offer the opportunity to return to an earlier, apparently less-
complicated practice of parenting “someone else’s child” in 
which secrecy about the child’s origins prevailed, in which 
“passing” as a biological family stood out as an explicit objec-
tive,51 and in which one could easily avoid ongoing contact with 
 
 47. Appleton, supra note 12, at 410–21. 
 48. BARTHOLET, supra note 38, at 69. 
 49. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (“Even though [not] biologically related to [the child], they are still 
her lawful parents given their initiating role as the intended parents in her 
conception and birth.”); Raftopol v. Ramey, No. 18482, 2011 WL 169409, at *14 
(Conn. 2011) (holding that “intended parents who are parties to a valid gesta-
tional agreement acquire parental status . . . without respect to their biological 
relationship to the children”); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 730 (Tenn. 2005) 
(recognizing genetic father and gestator without a genetic relationship as legal 
parents on equal footing, based on their intent to be resulting children’s legal 
father and mother, respectively); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (Supp. 2010) (“If a married woman bears a child of as-
sisted reproduction used a donor’s sperm, the donor will not be the father in 
any event. Her husband will be the father unless and until the husband’s lack 
of consent to the assisted reproduction is proven . . . .”); see Marjorie Maguire 
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportuni-
ty for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 322–23 (proposing this ap-
proach). 
 50. See Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 34, 37, available at 2007 WLNR 13468586. 
 51. E.g., Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 72 (Utah 
1998) (“As a result of their fertility treatment, the [plaintiffs] became the par-
ents of three normal, healthy children whom the couple suggest do not look as 
much like [their nonbiological father] as different children might have and 
whose blood type could not be descended from his. This result thwarted the 
couple’s intention to believe and represent that the triplets are [his] biological 
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the child’s genetic parents. Of course, today this “golden age” of 
adoption evokes many criticisms, including some that spill over 
into the discourse of assisted reproduction. Thus, for example, 
current calls for ensuring that children conceived collaborative-
ly can exercise a “right to know” their genetic parents parallel 
efforts in the 1990s to open sealed adoption files to interested 
adoptees.52 
D. THE PLACE OF REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY AND GENDER 
EQUALITY 
In making a case for increased access to infertility treat-
ments, Cohen and Chen join authorities who have recognized 
procreation as an important value and define it expansively to 
include situations when its exercise requires medical interven-
tion and contributions from others, such as genetic donors53—
and members of the insurance pool. Such authorities commonly 
trace this value to language used by the Supreme Court in con-
traception and abortion cases, which recognize reproduction as 
a highly personal choice. The autonomy to decide “whether to 
bear or beget a child”54 suggests that one should have the free-
dom to procreate and to avoid procreation alike. 
Yet in attempting to provide stronger theoretical support 
for IVF subsidies, Cohen and Chen depart from this equipoise 
that would accord the same respect to both choices. By portray-
ing infertility as a health impairment (“deviations [from] spe-
cies-typical normal functioning”55), Cohen and Chen naturalize 
conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and repronormativity itself.56 
Although this move helps them arrive at their narrow norma-
 
children.”). 
 52. E.g., Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, Note, The Right to Know One’s Ge-
netic Origin: Can, Should, or Must a State that Extends This Right to Adoptees 
Extend an Analogous Right to Children Conceived with Donor Gametes?, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 365, 374–84 (2001); Katrina Clark, Who’s Your Daddy? Mine Was 
an Anonymous Sperm Donor. That Made Me Mad. So I Decided to Find Him, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at B1. 
 53. See, e.g., Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (recognizing embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling specifically, in 
addition to other procedures noted throughout opinion, as constitutionally pro-
tected reproductive choices); ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 22–23, 32–42; cf. 
Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 502 n.83 (exploring expansion of the argument 
to include “dysfertile” single individuals and same-sex couples). 
 54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169–70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 55. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 517. 
 56. See Franke, supra note 26, at 183–97. 
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tive destination, this notion of “normal functioning” undercuts 
arguments for insurance subsidies for contraception, which 
have encountered some notable pushback in recent times.57 
And, of course, the legal status of abortion, not to mention 
abortion subsidies, remains highly contested.58 
These are serious problems for women that extend well 
beyond what Cohen and Chen describe as “radical feminist cri-
tiques of IVF.”59 Strengthening the theoretical foundation for 
access to IVF, without attending to questions of contraception 
and abortion, profoundly threatens gender equality, which even 
liberal feminism embraces.60 That some women want assis-
tance in becoming pregnant at some particular moments61 does 
not diminish the interests of women who would (sometimes or 
always) avoid pregnancy. 
II.  A VIEW FROM ECONOMICS   
Can IVF mandates cause a large increase in IVF usage 
while also causing an increase or having no effect on adoption 
demand? The “substitution theory,” an arm-chair theory post-
ulating that IVF mandates cause a decrease in adoption de-
mand, draws support from hazy recollections of Economics 101. 
But economic theory does not predict the effect of IVF man-
dates on adoption demand. Although arm-chair theorizing is no 
substitute for empirical analysis, theorizing, properly done, 
does clarify the conditions under which IVF mandates will 
cause either an increase, no change, or a decrease in adoption 
demand. A proper analysis of the effect of IVF mandates re-
 
 57. E.g., In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 943 
(8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that employers must cover contraception 
just as preventative treatments for other medical conditions); Ricardo Alonso-
Zaldivar, Labeling Birth Control “Preventive Medicine” Could Make Contracep-
tion Free for US Women, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2010 (citing critics’ descriptions of 
pregnancy as a healthy condition and contraception as a lifestyle choice); Erik 
Eckholm, Budget Feud Ropes in Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2011 at A16, available at 2011 WLNR 3234099 (noting House of Representa-
tives proposal to eliminate all aid for family planning). 
 58. E.g., Robert Pear, Push for Stricter Abortion Limits Is Expected in 
House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A34, available at 2010 WLNR 2456897 
(predicting effort to ban federal subsidy payments to health insurance plans 
that cover abortion). 
 59. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 506. 
 60. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). 
 61. See Madeira, supra note 27. 
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quires us to recognize that infertile couples are heterogeneous 
in their resources and their preferences and, hence, heteroge-
neous in their responses to IVF mandates. The analysis itself, 
however, is somewhat subtle. 
A simple example illustrates the need to distinguish among 
couples on the basis of how they would behave in the absence of 
IVF mandates and how they would respond to such mandates. 
Although a proper analysis requires us to distinguish among 
seven types of couples, we begin by illustrating the need to dis-
tinguish among different types of couples by considering only 
two:62 
• infertile couples that with or without IVF mandates 
would try IVF and, if it failed, would then try to 
adopt, and 
• infertile couples that without IVF mandates would 
try neither IVF nor adoption, but with mandates 
would try IVF and, if it failed, would not try to adopt. 
The effect of IVF mandates on adoption demand depends 
on several factors including the number of couples of each type, 
the extent to which couples of each type increase their usage of 
IVF, and the success rates of IVF. This dependence is clear if 
we consider the extreme and unlikely cases in which the in-
crease in IVF usage comes entirely from couples of one type or 
the other. Suppose first that the increase in IVF usage comes 
entirely from couples that, with or without mandates, would try 
IVF and, if it failed, would then try to adopt. For these couples, 
IVF mandates lead to more IVF cycles and, to the extent that 
these additional cycles are successful, to a decrease in adoption 
demand. This scenario is consistent with substitution theory: 
IVF mandates reduce adoption demand. 
Now suppose instead that the increase in IVF usage comes 
entirely from couples that, absent the mandates, would try nei-
ther IVF nor adoption. In this case, there is no change in adop-
tion demand: for these couples, adoption demand was zero 
without IVF mandates and remains zero with mandates.  
This example, with only two types of couples, demonstrates 
that IVF mandates can cause a large increase in IVF usage 
while having no effect on adoption demand. More generally, it 
demonstrates that the effect of IVF mandates on adoption de-
mand depends on which couples increase their usage of IVF. In 
a proper analysis, one that recognizes seven types of couples, 
IVF mandates that cause large increases in IVF usage are 
 
 62. We address the others below. See infra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
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compatible with increases in adoption demand as well as with 
no change or decreases in adoption demand.  
It is sometimes possible to infer which types of couples in-
crease their use of IVF from the effect of IVF mandates on 
adoption demand. In our example of a society consisting of the 
two types of infertile couples, suppose we observe that IVF 
mandates have a large effect on IVF utilization but no effect on 
adoption demand. Then we can conclude that the increase in 
IVF utilization comes entirely from the infertile couples that 
would not otherwise adopt.63 In our example, any increased use 
of IVF by the other type of infertile couples (i.e., couples that, in 
the absence of mandates, would try IVF and, if it failed, would 
try to adopt) would cause a decrease in adoption demand. And 
that, of course, would contradict our assumption that we ob-
served IVF mandates to have no effect on adoption demand. 
We analyze decisions regarding IVF and adoption as a two-
stage game: at the first stage, couples try (or do not try) IVF; at 
the second stage, couples try (or do not try) to adopt.64 A “strat-
egy” is a plan specifying an action at the first stage (i.e., wheth-
er or not to try IVF) and an action at the second stage (i.e., 
whether or not to try to adopt). The second-stage action may 
depend on the outcome of the first stage (i.e., whether IVF is 
successful). For example, a possible strategy is to try IVF at the 
first stage and (1) if IVF fails, try to adopt at the second stage 
and (2) if IVF succeeds, do not try to adopt at the second stage. 
Each couple has two strategies, one they would choose without 
IVF mandates and one they would choose with mandates. A 
couple’s type is defined by its pair of strategies. 
We simplify the analysis by making five assumptions. 
First, we assume that couples want to have exactly one addi-
tional child, so couples that succeed with IVF do not try to 
adopt another child. Second, we assume that couples that both 
try IVF and try to adopt will try IVF before trying to adopt. 
This timing assumption rules out couples simultaneously try-
ing IVF and adoption; it also rules out couples trying to adopt 
and, if adoption fails, trying IVF. Third, we assume that IVF 
mandates make IVF free; that is, couples trying IVF incur no 
out-of-pocket costs (e.g., insurance co-pays). Fourth, we assume 
that trying to adopt is expensive and that, because of the cost, 
 
 63. This conclusion depends on the implicit assumption that, for both 
types of couples, additional IVF cycles lead to at least some additional births. 
 64. This is a “game against nature” rather than against a rational, calcu-
lating opponent. 
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some infertile couples do not try to adopt. Fifth, we assume 
that additional IVF cycles lead to at least some additional 
births.65 These simplifying assumptions enable us to see more 
clearly the effects of IVF mandates on adoption demand. 
We classify infertile couples into four mutually exclusive 
groups on the basis of the strategies they choose in the absence 
of IVF mandates. We denote these strategies by IAo, XAo, IXo, 
and XXo. The first letter, an I or an X, indicates trying or not 
trying IVF at the first stage; the second letter, an A or an X, in-
dicates trying or not trying to adopt at the second stage. The 
superscript o indicates that these strategies are those that 
couples choose in the absence of IVF mandates. What IA 
couples have in common is their strategy, not their observable 
actions. All IA couples begin by trying IVF, all of them would 
respond in the same way if IVF succeeds (they would not try to 
adopt), and all of them would respond in the same way if IVF 
fails (they would try to adopt). Strategies are defined in terms 
of hypothetical behavior. For example, the distinction between 
the IAo and IXo couples manifests itself in behavior only if IVF 
fails; if IVF succeeds, their observable behavior is identical. To 
summarize, in the absence of IVF mandates, our assumptions 
imply that infertile couples fall into one of four mutually exclu-
sive groups: 
 
IAo try IVF and, if it fails, try to adopt 
XAo do not try IVF, try to adopt 
IXo try IVF and, if it fails, do not try to adopt 
XXo do not try IVF; do not try to adopt 
 
At the cost of introducing some notational clutter, we could 
refine our classification of IAo couples by distinguishing among 
those that would try to adopt after one failed IVF cycle (I1Ao), 
those that would try to adopt after two failed cycles, (I2Ao), etc. 
For our purposes, however, a more refined classification is un-
necessary provided we recognize that IVF mandates may cause 
IAo and IXo couples to undergo more IVF cycles than they would 
in the absence of mandates. For both IAo and IXo couples, these 
additional cycles lead to at least some additional births. For IAo 
couples, additional births decrease adoption demand. For IXo 
 
 65. We do not assume that the probability of success is the same for all 
types of couples, or that it remains the same for additional cycles. 
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couples, additional births have no effect on adoption demand: 
their adoption demand, with and without mandates, is zero. 
IVF mandates have three distinct effects. First, consider 
couples that were going to try IVF in the absence of mandates 
(IAo and IXo couples). These couples may respond to IVF man-
dates by undergoing more cycles than they would without 
mandates. Although we do not treat increases in the number of 
cycles by these couples as a different strategy, we must recog-
nize their effect on adoption demand. Because additional IVF 
cycles result in more births, they cause a reduction in adoption 
demand by couples whose second-stage action was to try to 
adopt if IVF failed. Couples that in the absence of mandates 
would try IVF have no incentive to not try IVF (i.e., to change 
an I to an X), or to reduce the number of IVF cycles they under-
go.  
Second, consider couples that were not going to try IVF in 
the absence of mandates, XAo and XXo couples. These couples 
may respond to IVF mandates by trying IVF at the first stage 
(i.e., by changing their first stage action from an X to an I). 
This is a predictable response to the fall in the price of IVF: 
couples that did not try IVF because of its high cost will now 
try IVF, while couples that did not try IVF for personal, reli-
gious, or ideological reasons will not. The XAo couples that try 
IVF and for which IVF is successful will reduce their adoption 
demand. The XAo couples that try IVF and for which IVF fails 
will adopt. The XXo couples that try IVF have no effect on adop-
tion demand: their adoption demand, with and without man-
dates, is zero.66 
Third, consider couples whose strategy was to try IVF and, 
if it failed, not to try to adopt (IXo couples). For these couples, 
IVF mandates free up the money they would otherwise have 
spent on IVF. Some of these couples will save this windfall for 
their retirement, others will spend it on new cars, and others 
will spend it on adoption—that is, they will change their 
second-stage action from X to A. All of these responses to IVF 
mandates are, in the jargon of economics, “income effects.” 
Thus, an increase in adoption demand is a predictable response 
by some of the IXo couples that, in the absence of mandates, did 
not try to adopt because of the cost. Some of these resource-
 
 66. Cohen and Chen suggest that undergoing failed IVF cycles may 
change couples’ preferences in favor of adoption, but it seems equally plausible 
that undergoing failed IVF cycles may change couples’ preferences against 
adoption. In any case, they cite no supporting evidence. 
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constrained IXo couples now become IA couples: they try IVF 
and, if it fails, they try to adopt. These are the couples that in-
crease their adoption demand.  
We use the arrow symbol to relate couples’ strategies with-
out IVF mandates to their strategies with IVF mandates. For 
example, {XAo → IA} indicates XAo couples that, with man-
dates, try IVF and if IVF fails, try to adopt; {XAo → XA} indi-
cates XAo couples that, with mandates, do not change their 
strategy—they do not try IVF and they try to adopt. 
Our analysis implies that with IVF mandates couples may 
choose the same strategy they chose without mandates or they 
may choose a different strategy. If they choose a different strat-
egy, however, our analysis implies that there is at most one dif-
ferent strategy that is plausible for each couple, given the 
strategy they choose without mandates. We associate a pair of 
strategies with each couple: the strategy they would choose 
without IVF mandates and the strategy they would choose with 
mandates. There are four possible strategies with mandates 
and four possible strategies without mandates. Combinatorics 
teaches that there are sixteen mathematically possible strategy 
pairs. Our analysis, however, implies that only seven of these 
sixteen strategy pairs are plausible, and we classify couples in-
to types based on these seven strategy pairs. The table below 
lists the seven couple types, identified by their strategy pairs, 
and the implications of each for adoption demand. 
 
COUPLE TYPE  IMPLICATIONS FOR ADOPTION 
DEMAND 
{IAo → IA} decrease  
{XAo → XA} no effect  
{XAo → IA} decrease  
{IXo → IX} no effect  
{IXo → IA} increase  
{XXo → XX} no effect  
{XXo → IX} no effect 
 
The next four paragraphs explain the strategy pairs and 
their implications for adoption demand; readers who feel suffi-
ciently comfortable with the analysis can skip these four para-
graphs. 
The IAo couples may utilize more IVF cycles than they 
would without mandates. To the extent that these additional 
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cycles result in additional births, adoption demand by IAo 
couples will decrease.67 
Some XAo couples respond to IVF mandates by choosing 
the same strategy as before, while others respond by trying 
IVF. Those that try IVF become IA couples and, for some of 
these couples, IVF will fail while for others it will succeed. 
Those couples for which IVF fails will try to adopt, while those 
for which IVF succeeds will not try to adopt. This implies that 
adoption demand by XAo couples will decrease because, in the 
absence of IVF mandates, all XAo couples would try to adopt.68 
Some IXo couples respond to IVF mandates by remaining 
IX couples, others by becoming IA couples. On balance, this in-
creases adoption demand. The intuition is straightforward. Al-
though some of the IXo couples would not choose to adopt even 
if adoption were free, other IXo couples choose this strategy be-
cause they cannot afford to try both IVF and adoption. Without 
IVF mandates and faced with a choice between IVF and adop-
tion, the IXo couples chose IVF.69 The IVF mandate allows IXo 
couples that would like to try IVF to do so: if IVF fails, they try 
to adopt.70 We do not claim that all IXo couples for which IVF 
fails will try to adopt; some IXo couples would not try to adopt 
even if adoption were free.71 Because the IXo couples did not 
adopt in the absence of mandates, IVF mandates cannot reduce 
their adoption demand. Some IXo couples utilize more IVF 
cycles with the mandates than they would have without the 
mandates, so the number of IXo couples for which IVF is suc-
cessful will increase. Other IXo couples will undergo the same 
number of cycles as they would without IVF mandates. Al-
though couples for which IVF is successful would not adopt, 
they do not reduce their adoption demand because, absent 
mandates, no IXo couples would adopt. Hence, the increase in 
adoption demand comes from the {IXo → IA} couples for which 
IVF fails. Without IVF mandates, couples that want IVF would 
 
 67.  IVF mandates provide no incentive for IAo couples to choose a differ-
ent strategy. Some IAo couples will undergo more IVF cycles, but we do not 
treat an increase in the number of cycles as a different strategy. 
 68. IVF mandates provide no motive for XAo couples to become IX or XX 
couples. 
 69.  Faced with the same alternatives, other couples chose to try to adopt 
rather than to try IVF and thus are XAo couples. 
 70. In the case of XAo couples, IVF mandates cause a decrease in adoptions. 
 71. Similarly, even if mandates made IVF free, not all XAo couples will try 
IVF; some couples find IVF unacceptable for personal, religious, or ideological 
reasons.  
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have to pay for IVF; with IVF mandates, couples do not have to 
pay for IVF and the reduction in the cost of IVF creates an in-
come effect. Some couples for which IVF fails will use the mon-
ey they would otherwise have spent on IVF trying to adopt. IVF 
mandates give IXo couples no reason to change the I to an X. 
The XXo couples (i.e., couples that in the absence of man-
dates would not try IVF and would not try to adopt) may, with 
the mandate, either remain XX or become IX couples (i.e., they 
may try IVF and, if IVF fails, not try to adopt). If an XXo couple 
tries IVF and fails, the couple’s situation at the end of the first 
stage is the same as it would have been in the absence of man-
dates; hence, the couple has no more reason to adopt with IVF 
mandates than it did without IVF mandates. Thus XXo couples, 
regardless of whether they remain XX couples or become IX 
couples, would not adopt. IVF mandates do not reduce adoption 
demand because, without IVF mandates, none of the XXo 
couples would adopt. With and without IVF mandates, the 
adoption demand of the XXo couples is zero.  
A population’s response to IVF mandates depends on the 
number of couples of each type and the magnitudes of the 
couples’ responses. More specifically, a population’s response is 
a weighted sum of the responses of the seven types of couples, 
where the weights are the number of couples of each type. 
Accepting Cohen and Chen’s empirical claim that IVF 
mandates cause an increase in adoption demand, our two-stage 
game shows how this can occur. From the table, we see that on-
ly the {IXo → IA} couples respond to IVF mandates by increas-
ing their adoption demand. Four types of couples—{XAo → XA}, 
{IXo → IX}, {XXo → XX}, {XXo → IX}—respond to IVF mandates 
by not changing their adoption demand. Three of these four 
types have zero adoption demand with and without IVF man-
dates. The fourth type, the {XAo → XA} couples, do not undergo 
IVF even when mandates make it free and to try to adopt, even 
though it is costly; hence, IVF subsidies have no effect on their 
adoption demand. The two remaining types, the {IAo → IA} and 
{XAo → IA} couples, respond to IVF mandates by reducing their 
adoption demand, just as substitution theory predicts. 
A population’s response to IVF mandates depends, then, on 
the magnitude of the increase in adoption demand from the 
{IXo → IA} couples and the magnitude of the decrease from the 
{IAo → IA} and {XAo → IA} couples. Cohen and Chen’s empirical 
finding that IVF mandates increase adoption demand implies 
that the increases in adoption demand from the {IXo → IA} 
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couples swamps the reduction from the {IAo → IA} and 
{XAo → IA} couples. Our two-stage game shows how IVF man-
dates can lead to large increases in IVF utilization while hav-
ing no effect or a positive effect on adoption demand. 
  CONCLUSION   
In Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: 
Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should It 
Matter?,72 Cohen and Chen venture beyond the arm chair to 
examine the relationship between IVF mandates and adoption 
demand. Their two-part approach first joins the policy debate 
on this topic and then addresses the issue empirically. Our 
twibling analyses reply to both parts. We show that arm-chair 
theorizing, properly done, can illuminate the relationship be-
tween IVF mandates and adoption demand. Such theorizing 
demonstrates why Cohen and Chen’s principal empirical result, 
that IVF mandates appear to increase adoption demand, is not 
paradoxical. A different kind of arm-chair theorizing enables us 
to situate the tradeoff that Cohen and Chen examine in the 
wider context of family law, including the values, insights, and 
concerns found in scholarship about family law. Yet, arm-chair 
theorizing, even when properly done, complements investiga-
tions like Cohen and Chen’s; it does not provide a substitute for 
such work. 
 
 72. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1. 
